Carnivorous Thoughts, Part I
All Things Consider — By Naomi Scheinerman on November 10, 2011 at 9:00 am
I recently read “Eating Animals”, a beautifully written narrative by Jonathan Safron Foer in which he engages in a pseudo-investigative journalist quest to discover the origins of the majority of the meat we eat in the US and the functions and methods of the factory farming industry. Inspired by becoming a father, he explores the philosophical questions of vegetarianism and supports them with the facts he discovers. As a vegetarian myself, I was inspired to devote several blogs to this topic. In stage I, I will first explore these philosophical discussions and then in stage II analyze our society’s political and social approaches to understanding eating animals.
There are many philosophically grounded reasons for being vegetarian and even more so for being vegan. This blog will examine the moral objection to killing animals.
Most people feel that one should not kill an animal without a good reason. What then do we consider to be a good reason? Good reasons may include survival and/or health of a human being. This opens the door to two further questions: (1) Why do humans have more moral worth or value than animals? The question is important because its answer implies rights to protections and life. First, one must differentiate between a human and animal. There is a plethora of definitions available in this arena, including the capacity for rational thought, language, organization into civilizations, and higher level mental functioning’s in general: humans are better at processing information, forming communities, creativity, and engaging in complex thought. Next one must establish why those features place human beings on a higher moral platform than that of animals: what is it about being rational or more intellectual that endows humans with more protections to life?
If we were to value human life differently, basing morality on brain-centered processes, then there would be inordinately gross and disastrous consequences for people of different mental function, especially for infants and mentally handicapped members of society. Granted, to some extent our society does view people with higher processing abilities as more deserving of certain rights or privileges, such as access to certain places of higher education or special jobs and positions in society. However, society should not calculate the individual worth of people with differing mental functions because that suggests that differing utility implies differing rights to the protection of life.
This leads to the next question: (b) Even if we accept that humans do possess greater moral worth or value than animals (and I do believe that they do, mainly for emotive rather than rational reasons), does it follow that we are morally justified in killing animals for food? Well, for one thing killing animals is certainly not required (the second clause of this sentence felt very out of place since it’s a big step away from food). But how many of us will die off by not eating animals? I certainly haven’t over this past decade and believe I won’t for many more to come, thanks to sources of nutrition elsewhere (such as crunchy peanut butter). Foer even argues that protein is not actually a problem for most people and most health arguments for eating meat are unfounded. So if we do not need animals to survive, is there any other reason that we can use to justify killing them?
Indeed, the task of rationally explaining why human beings are of higher moral worth than animals, and therefore grounds for killing them for food, runs into a contradiction: on the one hand we should not differentiate between humans of differing mental function morally, but on the other we should differentiate between humans and animals morally because of differing mental functioning. Perhaps it is because animals do not have any moral worth at all. It seems unlikely that many even believe this, and if they do its for no good reason as we have shown that endangered species, pets, and other animals (e.g. those in movies or the zoo) not only deserve, but demand protection of life. Indeed, many cringe at the thought of killing a cute dog, but shrug at the notion of a slaughtered chicken. I argue that there is a logical disconnect here and, except in the event that it is to save a human life, there are no solidly founded reasons that justify killing animals for food.
By: Naomi Scheinerman
(Photo by Elyce Feliz under a Creative Commons license)
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Tags: animals, food, Philosophy, vegetarianism
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3 Comments
I think one important thing to keep in mind here is the perspective through which we administer moral worth. You argue that because humans do not value other human life based on their mental functions, they shouldn’t base the value of non-human life on mental functions either. You then elaborate that, as a society, we have already established that animals do have moral worth, giving examples such as endangered species and pets.
Well, what if we looked at it from the non-human perspective: different animals have variety of relationships with humans. For instance, a dog could see that a human = pack leader (therefore dinner provider, playmate, rule maker). On the other hand, a shark could see that human = dinner (therefore the human has no effect on the shark’s behavior). In the former, the dog equates the human with itself, giving humans its perception of “worth.” In the latter, the shark is indifferent to the behavior of the human (so to speak). As humans, we understand the roles we play in the lives of these animals. Perhaps that is why we feel more empathy for a pet dog that has to be put down than for a shark that is killed. It seems as though the more empathy we have for an animal, the more worth we have assigned to it.
That also may help explain why we try to save an endangered species. Our own minds create a sense of empathy when we hear that a species is dying off. In part, they could be dying because of negative human involvement, or we believe that it’s due to decreased “luck” of finding a mate wherever it lives. Both of these circumstances would trigger empathy from our end for the animal, because humans can relate to both situations.
Let’s examine the “worth” of a chicken on a small farm. From the perspective of the animal, it may at first be assumed they think a human = food provider. But once you really examine the situation, you see that isn’t true– they do not assign humans worth at all. They are merely classically conditioned to receive grain after seeing a human. This point is made even more clear when thinking about a chicken housed in an industrialized slaughterhouse: the chickens have no interactions with humans whatsoever, and again do not assign humans worth at all.
Because as humans we can process the idea that certain animals (e.g. dogs) assign us worth, while other animals (e.g. chickens) do not, we then assign moral worth back to them in relative proportions. And this idea of a gradual scale of “worth” can be seen even down at the lowest levels: we may feel more empathy for the chicken on the dinner table knowing it was raised on farm and being eaten by the farmer and his family, versus watching a family eating a rotisserie chicken they got from their nearest grocery store.
I guess I’m making the argument that this gradual scale of worth is in fact due to the gradual scale of mental function that different animals have, not in the sense of carrying out complex behaviors, but more so in the ability to have a perspective of humans in the first place.
Wow, really interesting perspective Tanya, thank you. I never thought to consider the moral worth that animals assign humans I guess mainly because we tend not to think of animals as rational thinkers. It’s interesting also because couldn’t you argue that humans have been conditioned to understand the value of animals? We are conditioned to be weary of certain animals (bears), drawn to others (dogs), and apathetic perhaps to others (birds, except when they’re in a tree above you…). So in that sense perhaps assignments of moral values is all just evolutionary, for both humans and animals?
I think that what your ideas touch on also is the fact that we do indeed assign relative worth to animals, but more so based on utility and emotional connection. We care that our pet dog is alive but not the cows we eat because our dogs are cute and cuddly and important to us in an emotional and meaningful way. We care differently about farm animals based on how much utility (such as food, monetary value, and such). So, it’s interesting the way you phrase why we care about endangered species. Yes, maybe out of empathy and most likely that is a part of it – certainly explains why bald eagles and pandas inspire a lot more attention than various kinds of endangered beetles or snakes. But they also have a utility for humans – maintaining animal populations is required for maintaining a stable and healthy ecosystem and environment is in human self interest.