The Fetishism of Morality

Jonathan Reé at The Philosopher’s Magazine:

“One of the most intriguing questions about morality, it seems to me, is what happens when it changes. What happens, for example, when the subordination of women to men, or their exclusion from higher education or the professions, ceases to seem innocuous or natural, and starts to be regarded as a grotesque abuse? Or when corporal punishment goes out of style, and homosexuality comes to be tolerated or even respected, or when cruelty to animals arouses indignation rather than indifference, and recklessness with natural resources becomes a badge not of magnificence but of monstrous irresponsibility?… Indeed it seems probable that moral change, over the long term, involves something like an expansion of horizons, a process of learning, or even – to use a dated word – something you might call progress.”

The idea that morality can change or develop is certainly an interesting one, and while some might balk at the idea, I think most of us would readily agree that we do make progress in our moral understanding.  Slavery, for instance, has gone from being widespread in the ancient world to being almost universally condemned today.  To an ever greater extent, people work for the rights and equality of people of all genders.  I think the point is clear: in some important ways, our moral understanding does improve with time.

What is in my opinion a more interesting idea – and one that the article doesn’t address – is that morality may be context-dependent, and changes in moral understanding through time may be good but not progressive per se.  What I mean by this is that maybe it’s not the case that moral laws are solid and unchanging through time, and we simply discover more of them as time goes on; rather, perhaps what is objectively moral depends on the time and place in which you find yourself.

Some people do acknowledge context-dependent moral standards in individual situations – for instance, while killing is generally condemned, many believe that killing someone in self-defense is not morally condemnable.  In this case, killing is not inherently good or bad; it just depends on the situation an individual finds herself in.

The kind of context-dependent moral standards I’m talking about would be much broader.  Perhaps different moralities are suitable for different societies.  A rough example off the top of my head: maybe in a society threatened by a severe, deadly epidemic, strict government control and regulation is acceptable – even good – for the society, whereas in a stable, safe society such control is obtrusive, despotic, and immoral.  That may not be a very good example – perhaps you, dear reader, can come up with a better one.

Just to be clear, I’m not endorsing a moral relativism that says, “Anything goes; everyone has a personal morality, and you can do whatever you want!”  Morality would be real – objective, in a sense – but determined by social and environmental conditions rather than abstract, immutable moral laws.

-Aaron Bekemeyer